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COMING OUT OF THE DARK: ACIDEVING 
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS BY SOUTH AMERICAN 
MILITARY REGIMES 
RosEANN M. LAToRE* 
Abstract: The military regimes of the countries of the Southern Cone 
of South America cooperated under Operation Condor to eradicate all 
political opposition throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The military 
leaders of these regimes are only now being brought to justice for their 
crimes, which include widespread killing and "disappearances" of 
political opponents and, in Argentina, the stealing of babies born to 
doomed political dissidents. It is only in the last decade that these 
crimes have been brought to light so that the perpetrators can be 
brought to justice and nations deeply wounded can begin to heal. 
INTRODUCTION 
"He who saves the nation does not break any law. "1 During their 
1985 trial, the defense counsel for Argentinean military officers ac-
cused of human rights violations used this quote attributed to Napo-
leon to justifY their actions.2 This feeling of moral rectitude and belief 
in a higher good of national security served as the basis for human 
rights violations by military regimes throughout South America, and 
resulted in the torture, murder, kidnapping, and "disappearance" of 
tens of thousands of people in the last four decades. 3 While these 
types of abuses became less pervasive with the collapse of the military 
regimes, they continue today in South America and throughout the 
world.4 
* Roseann M. Latore is the Symposium Chair & Solicitations Editor for the Boston Col-
lege International & Comparative Law Review. 
I CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 86 (1996). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. at 33, 54. 
4 See AMNESTY lNT'L, GETTING AwAY WITH MuRDER 2 (1993); see also Gabrielle 
Gamini, Fujimari Accused of Over 4,000 Deaths in War Against Rebels, TIMES (LoNDON), Nov. 
29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28133479. Peru's Congress plans to investigate the disap-
pearance, killing, and torture of 4000 in a campaign against left-wing rebels in the 1990s. 
Id. Human rights groups allege thousands of abuses in President Fujimori's war against the 
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The worst cases of killings and "disappearances" have occurred in 
countries where the conflict was claimed to be "all but invisible to the 
outside observer."5 In Guatemala, for example, tens of thousands of 
people have been murdered since 1960 in a war against guerrillas 
whose campaigns were barely operational at times.6 In El Salvador, 
almost 2% of the population were wiped out as a result of political 
killings and disappearances during its 1980-1992 civil war.7 
In the countries of South America, including Brazil, Uruguay, 
Chile, and Argentina, the military regimes took control of their re-
spective countries under the guise of national security.8 Mter pursuing 
the immediate threats to national security, often left-wing guerrilla 
movements, the regimes cast their nets wider, ensnaring all those they 
considered dangerous.9 In Argentina, for example, pregnant prison-
ers gave birth in captivity, and the fate of their babies still is being un-
covered.l0 
This Note focuses on the human rights abuses of countries in the 
"Southern Cone" of South America, specifically, Chile, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Part I discusses the history behind 
the military regimes and their use of terror and torture to control the 
citizenry. Part II discusses the movement to bring these human rights 
violators to justice, and highlights the unique cases of baby snatching 
in Argentina. Part III analyzes alternative methods of prosecution of 
former military officials for their parts in human rights abuses, which 
are just beginning to take hold, and explains how these methods hold 
the key to releasing those countries from their pasts in order to finally 
achieve healingjustice. 
guerrillas and the drug trade, and claim that his campaign to ferret out rebels led to 
abuses against teachers, unionists, and students. /d. If these crimes actually were commit-
ted, Fujimori will be one of South America's worst human rights abusers. /d. 
5 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4, at 6. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. at 2. 
8 See NINO, supra note 1, at 33, 34, 36, 53. 
9 See id. at 33, 35, 36, 54. 
IO SeeRrTA ARDITTI, SEARCHING FOR LIFE 24,50 (1999). 
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I. THE MILITARY REGIMES 
A. South American Military &gimes and Operation Condor 
In the 1970s, military regimes took control of several South 
American countries.11 The military governments came into power 
under the guise of protecting national security and to replace weak 
and corrupt governments, often in the face of violent left-wing guer-
rilla movements.12 The regimes' common thread was the use of a per-
vasive sense of terror to fortify their rule, along with the elimination 
ofbasic human rights.l3 
In addition to this common technique of terror, the military re-
gimes solidified their connections through a program called "Opera-
tion Condor."14 Operation Condor (Condor) was the code name for a 
system of cooperation between the military regimes of the Southern 
Cone countries, including Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, 
and Uruguay.15 Under Condor, allegedly named for the national bird 
of Chile, 16 the regimes would collect and exchange information about 
leftists in their countries.17 When a person from one Condor country 
tried to escape by fleeing across the border, the country to which he 
fled would abduct him and turn him over to his birth country's secu-
rity force.18 
Yet even before Condor, there was collaboration by the military 
forces of the countries of South America.19 Brazil, for example, had 
provided military training throughout the Southern Cone to combat 
urban guerrilla movements.2° Condor, however, was set up at there-
quest of General Augusto Pinochet of Chile in 1975,21 and most of its 
11 NINO, supra note 1, at 33. 
12Jd. 
15Jd. 
14 See Cesar Chelala, US Should Declassify Fiks on Repression in Argentina, ST. Loms 
PosT-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2000, at B7, availabk at 2000 WL 3546303. 
15Jd. 
16 Patrice M. Jones, Brazil Probes Conspiracy by Dictators to KiU Foes, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 
2000, at 3, availabk at 2000 WL 3671072. 
17 Chelala, supra note 14. 
18 Marcia Valente, Rights-South America: Chipping Away at Impunity, INTER PREss SERV., 
June 19, 2000, availabk at 2000 WL 4091773 [hereinafter Valente, Chipping Away]. 
19 Maria Osava, Rights-Latin America: operation Condor justice 20 Years Overdue, INTER 
PREss SERV., May 11, 2000, availabk at 2000 WL 4091156. 
20 ld. 
21Jd. 
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prominent attacks occurred under his command.22 In addition to 
controlling common alleged leftists, Condor may have been the driv-
ing force behind the mysterious deaths of several important political 
leaders.23 
The Condor countries also had in common a technique for deal-
ing with those they considered dangerous to their regimes.24 In addi-
tion to torture and murder, many were simply "disappeared. "25 Ac-
cording to Amnesty International, one is considered disappeared 
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person was taken 
by state officials or with their agreement, and the authorities then 
deny any knowledge of that person's fate or whereabouts.26 The term 
"disappearance," or desaparecido, was first used in 1966 in connection 
with the Guatemalan government's practice of disposing of political 
opponents in secret.27 While people disappeared in all the military-
run countries, the term became synonymous with Argentina because 
of its pervasive use.28 
The efforts of the relatives of the disappeared have brought to 
light most of the information about Condor.29 Information also has 
been revealed by accident, as was the case when documents were 
found in Paraguay in the early 1990s.30 These documents were the 
secret files of the police force of dictator Alfredo Stroessner, and de-
tailed their actions.31 The records indicated that Argentine and Uru-
guayan opposition activists had been held in Paraguay and then trans-
ferred to the military in Argentina, after which they disappeared.32 
The Paraguay documents also indicated that the death of a former 
president of Brazil was connected to Condor,33 prompting new inves-
tigations in that country. 34 
22 Kevin G. Hall, South America Struggles to Uncover Past Abuses, ARiz. REPUB., May 17, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 8031739 [hereinafter Hall, South America]. 
23 See id. 
24 See, e.g., NINO, supra note I, at 33; Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
25 See id. 
26 See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 4, at 9. 
27 See id. at 13. 
2B See lAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 31 (1990); see also Valente, Chipping Away, supra 
note 18. 
29 Osava, supra note 19. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Hall, South America, supra note 22. 
34 See Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
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B. Military Rule and Human Rights Abuses in Chile 
In 1973, the military overthrew the socialist party government of 
Salvador Allende in Chile and instituted a harsh police state.35 Strict 
press censorship, widespread detentions and executions, and purges 
of public administration and education ensued. 36 The work of the 
government's military and surveillance unit brought about the tor-
ture, disappearance, and exile of many people, as well as the deaths of 
some politically dangerous enemies in other countries.!l7 In 1978, the 
government granted the military amnesty that covered almost all past 
abuses.38 
In 1988, General Pinochet was voted out of the presidency by a 
plebiscite, but remained as Chief of the Army under the new constitu-
tion, written by Pinochet, which was approved by plebiscite in 1980.39 
The political parties' participation in the election implied acceptance 
of both the 1978 amnesty law and the 1980 Pinochet-engineered con-
stitution, but because participation in the election was the only way to 
remove Pinochet from power, the parties elected to field candidates.40 
As the legislature and judiciary were still mostly loyal to Pinochet, 
there was little the new president could do about the amnesty law, 
thus limiting his ability to address the issue of human rights. 41 
In 1991, the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation was cre-
ated to compile a report of human rights abuses during the military 
regime and assess their effects on the citizenry.42 The report, released 
in March of that year, was important because it was an official ac-
knowledgment of the truth, recognizing the harm done by the mili-
tary.43 While it served to raise social consciousness, however, it could 
not determine the fate of many of those still missing.44 
C. Human Rights Violations During the Military Regime in Uruguay 
When Uruguay's economy began to falter and terrorists began to 
murder and kidnap in order to voice political opposition in the 1960s, 
55 NINO, supra note 1, at 36. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 37. 
sg Id. 
40 See NINO, supra note 1, at 37. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 37-38. 
45 Id. at 38. 
44 Id. 
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the civilian government invited the military to intervene.45 Mter the 
military broke the guerrilla movement in 1973, the military used pub-
lic protest against their violent and tortuous methods as an excuse to 
root out subversion in universities, public administration, the profes-
sions, and the political class.46 That year, the military took full control, 
suspending Congress and reducing the president to a figurehead.47 
The government classified the entire population of Uruguay into 
three categories according to their degree of risk to the regime.48 Be-
tween 1970 and 1985, more than 10% of the population went into 
exile, one person in fifty was detained, and one in five hundred re-
ceived a long prison term.49 One hundred fifty Uruguayans disap-
peared, most of whom were abducted in Argentina50 where the worst 
human rights violations against Uruguayans were committed. 51 
General elections were held in November, 1984, after the nego-
tiation of the Naval Club Agreement between military and civilian 
politicians.52 In 1986, the Uruguayan Congress approved the "Law 
Nullifying the State's Claim to Punish Certain Crimes," also known as 
the "impunity law. "53 This law effectively ended all trials against mili-
tary and police officers for human rights abuses during the dictator-
ship.54 While Argentina and Chile created truth commissions and 
held trials of junta leaders, in Uruguay no officer has ever been tried 
by a civilian court, and by mid-2000, there still never had been official 
recognition of or investigation into the terrorism and crimes of the 
dictatorship. 55 
D. Brazil's Military Regime and Human Rights Abuses 
The military came to power in Brazil through a 1964 coup, and 
its power grew more oppressive as its rule continued.56 The abuses in 
Brazil were not as widespread as in other countries in the region, but 
45 NINO, supra note l, at 34. 
46 Id. at 34, 35. 
47 Id. at 35. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
51 NINO, supra note 1, at 35. 
52 Id. 
53 Maria Delgado, Truth and justice in Uruguay, NACIA REP. ON THE AM., July 1, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 12982323. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See NINO, supra note 1, at 33. 
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Brazil was an active participant in Operation Condor. 57 At least fifteen 
Brazilians disappeared in other countries, mostly in Chile and Argen-
tina. 58 In 1978, a joint effort between the police and military of both 
Uruguay and Brazil resulted in the detainment and torture of two 
Uruguayans who were detained in Brazil, followed by their secret 
transfer to Uruguay. 59 Brazil also gave arms to the military in Paraguay 
to aid its bid to overthrow the civilian government.60 
In 1979, a mutual amnesty was declared by the government, cov-
ering both those who had committed political crimes and state secu-
rity agents who had violated human rights between 1964 and 1979.61 
By the time a civilian president was elected in 1985, the worst viola-
tions were products of the distant past. 62 Disappearances were less 
common and the violations were less widespread than in Argentina 
and Uruguay, so the civilian and military leaders were able to com-
promise, with the civilian politicians respecting the amnesty and the 
military allowing a return to democracy.63 In 1995, the government 
declared the disappeared dead and closed the cases, indemnifying the 
families of the victims, and the military swore an oath of subordina-
tion to civilian authorities.64 Nevertheless, there have been few at-
tempts to obtain justice for those who were abused during the dicta-
torship. 55 
E. Argentina's Dirty War 
Amid growing economic crisis, violence, and corruption, a mili-
tary junta overthrew Isabel Peron in March, 1976.66 Under the Doc-
trine of National Security, 57 the president, General Jorge Videla, and 
the military curtailed liberties, dissolved Congress, replaced judges 
and supreme court justices, dismissed governors and legislators, 
purged universities, and controlled radio, television, and unions.68 
57 /d. at 33, 34; Osava, supra note 19; Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
58 Osava, supra note 19. 
59 /d. 
60 Hall, South America, supra note 22. 
61 NINO, supra note 1, at 33-34. 
62 /d. 
M Seeid. 
64 Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
65 See Jones, supra note 16. 
66 NINO, supra note 1, at 43. 
67 ARI>ITTI, supra note 10, at 11. 
68 NINO, supra note 1, at 53, 54. 
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The military extended its judicial jurisdiction to civilian subversive 
acts, now punishable by death.69 
Unprecedented violence followed, carried out by organized task 
forces for abductions, tortures, and interrogations.7° No one knows 
the exact number of people killed or why. 71 Official sources put the 
number between 9000 and 11,000,72 but human rights groups esti-
mate that 30,000 disappeared or died under military rule.73 While 
some of those killed or disappeared were members of left-wing guer-
rilla organizations, others were targeted for being their relatives, 
friends, lawyers, or for being journalists, "dangerous" writers, politi-
cians, psychoanalysts, human rights group members, and trade union-
ists.74 
Not even children were safe.75 In an incident that came to be 
known as "The Night of the Pencils," the regime kidnapped a group 
of teenagers from their homes. 76 As student leaders in their high 
school, the children had started a movement to demand student dis-
counts on public transportation. 77 Mter being raped and tortured, 
only three were eventually set free, while the others were murdered.78 
While the government did not officially acknowledge the atroci-
ties, it justified them by saying that, "[t]his was a 'dirty war' against an 
enemy without uniform or flag. "79 Its enemies did not follow the rules 
of war, so the government claimed that it was justified in using ex-
treme measures in its fight against subversion and aggression.80 De-
spite the people's opposition to the actions, protest against the regime 
was difficult to organize; if one disappeared, there was no physical 
69 /d. at 54. 
7o Id. 
71 Dave Perkins, Mothers Remember Victims of 'Dirty War, 'ToRONTO STAR, Dec. 8, 2000, at 
N02, available at 2000 WL 30322980. 
72 See, e.g., Former junta Member Jailed, AP NEWSWIRES, Dec. 1, 2000, available at 12/1/00 
APWIRES 19:54:00; Marcela Valente, Right-Argentina: Senate Delays Military Promotions, IN-
TER PREss SERV., Dec. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28920255 [hereinafter Valente, Senate 
Delays]. 
75 Daughter of Military Regime Victim Sues Adoptive Mother, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec.1, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 24771593; Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
74 NINO, supra note 1, at 57. 
75 Seeid. 
76 See ARDITTI, supra note 10, at 21. 
77 Id.; NINO, supra note 1, at 57. 
78 ARDITTI, supra note 10, at 21; GuEST, supra note 28, at 31. 
79 NINO, supra note 1, at 56. 
80 See id. 
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evidence of abuse to protest. 81 The fact that people simply vanished 
instilled terror and hopelessness in Argentineans. 52 
The junta needed the appearance of legality for its assaults on 
"subversion," therefore, it allowed the judiciary to survive.83 First, 
however, the junta purged the court of all opponents.84 The judiciary 
that remained could do little to stop the violations, rejecting, on gov-
ernment orders, most of the 80,000 habeas corpus petitions filed, and 
assessing judicial expenses to the petitioners. 85 While the Argentinean 
constitution guaranteed everyone a defense lawyer, it was difficult to 
get one, as between 1976 and 1983, 109 lawyers disappeared, 24 were 
killed, and 100 were detained without charge or trial.86 
The decline of the military regime began in 1980 with the falter-
ing of its economic plan and its later defeat in the Malvinas-Falkland 
Islands War.87 As the political parties began to push for elections and a 
lifting of the state of siege, the junta re-established itself with the "Fi-
nal Document of the Military Junta on the War Against Subversion 
and Terrorism" (Final Document).88 In this document, the junta took 
responsibility for the war, but justified its actions based on then Presi-
dent Italo Luder's 1975 decree allowing the military to crack down on 
guerrillas.89 All actions were approved by superior commands, a 
justification enshrined on the same day through an act stating that all 
operations against subversion and all terrorism by security forces, po-
lice, and prison guards were approved and supervised by the armed 
forces and the junta.90 These statements and laws laid the foundation 
for using the defense of "obeying orders," on which the military 
members relied during their trials for human rights abuses.91 
Five weeks before the 1983 election, President Reynaldo Bignone 
signed the "self-amnesty law,"92 also known as the Law of National 
Pacification. 93 The law granted blanket amnesty to anyone who aided 
and abetted any subversive and counter-subversive acts, be they com-
81 SeeARDITTI, supra note 10, at 14. 
82 See id. at 14, 15. 
83 GuEST, supra note 28, at 25. 
84 See NINO, supra note 1, at 54. 
85 Jd. 
86 See GuEST, supra note 28, at 26. 
87 ARmTTI, supra note 10, at 40; NINO, supra note 1, at 60, 61. 
88 See NINO, supra note 1, at 61. 
89 Id. at 61-62. 
90 See id. at 62. 
91 See id. at 62, 81. 
92 Id. at 64. 
93 ARDITTI, supra note 10, at 43. 
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mon or military crimes.94 This created a new legal obstacle to the trial 
of human rights abuses, as it prohibited civil court subpoenas or in-
terrogations of anyone for whom a prima facie showing of amnesty 
could be made, and forbade civil compensation for any of the acts 
covered by the law.95 
Mter President Raul Alfonsin's election in 1983, he focused on 
prosecuting only a small group of officers, as he could not go too far 
in punishing without provoking another coup.96 The government 
nullified the amnesty law, and reinterpreted sections of the Penal and 
Military Codes granting the defense of "due obedience," which cov-
ered almost all human rights violations, to allow prosecutions.97 Indi-
vidual commanders-in-chief were convicted in 1985, and the court 
found that while they had to have known about the procedures used 
by their subordinates, such as kidnapping, torture, seizure of prop-
erty, and murder, they did not know about the dispossession of real 
property, abduction of minors, and bribery.98 
Mter these convictions, trials were scheduled for many other 
military officers on charges of "following orders" during the regime, 
which angered the military.99 In order to pacify the military, the gov-
ernment passed the Full Stop Law in 1986, which set a deadline for 
initiating new prosecutions of military officers.l00 This law, however, 
excluded those cases concerning rape, theft, and the abduction and 
concealment of minors.l01 The passage of the Law of Due Obedience 
followed in 1987, granting amnesty to most potential defendants for 
dirty war crimes, except for rape, theft, and falsification of civil 
status.102 However, this law, like the Full Stop Law, did not cover the 
crimes of abduction and concealment of children.l03 
President Carlos Menem was elected in May, 1989, and by Octo-
ber, he had pardoned 400 people then on trial, in violation of Article 
95 of the Argentinean Constitution.l04 In December, 1990, he par-
94 NINO, supra note 1, at 65. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 71; GuEsT, supra note 28, at XV. 
97 NINO, supra note I, at 70, 71. 
98 Id. at 88, 89. 
99 See ARDITTI, supra note 10, at 46-4 7. 
100 Id. at 47. 
101 ld. 
1o2 Id. at 48. 
103 ld. at 49. 
104 NINO, supra note I, at 103. 
2002] justice for Victims of SQUth American Military Regimes 429 
doned all those already convicted for human rights violations.I05 Mter 
five years, the military leaders were free men.l06 
II. RETROACTIVE PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The history of South America shows that when governments re-
turned to democracy they did not investigate the human rights abuses 
of the past regime.l07 Often, the recently deposed military continued 
their surveillance of and put pressure on the new governments.1os 
Politicians, thankful that the military regime had ended, were reluc-
tant to provoke a confrontation by investigating abuses.l09 Often, the 
politicians also had participated in the past abuses and now wanted to 
do nothing which might expose themselves. no 
In the transitions to democracy from military rule in the 1980's, 
however, this changed.lll The breadth of state-sponsored terrorism 
and the growing international intolerance of human rights violations 
resulted in a general feeling that the violations needed to be con-
fronted.ll2 This led to several approaches in obtaining justice, includ-
ing attempts to prosecute those responsible through the reinterpreta-
tion of existing laws and the establishment of "truth commissions" to 
determine the fate of the missing.m The prosecution for baby-
kidnapping in Argentina has presented its own challenges.114 
The task of prosecuting past human rights abuses, however, has 
encountered numerous obstacles.ll5 Officials have to balance justice 
for those affected by the abuses against the need to build stable de-
mocracies and instill national reconciliation.116 The continued pres-
105 /d. at 104. 
106 See id. 
107 /d. at 32. 
108 See id. 
109 NINO, supra note 1, at 32. 
no See id. 
m /d. at 32-33. 
n2 See id. at 33. 
m See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 53; Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
ll4 See e.g., Army Chief Balz.a Harshly Criticizes Predecessor Over Human Rights, BBC SuM-
MARY OF WoRLD BROAD., Apr. 30, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File [hereinafter 
Army Chief]; Ken Warn, Net Starts to Close on Aging Generals as Argentina Probes Baby Kidnap-
pings, FIN. TIMES (LoNDON), Apr. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
m See Yanina Olivera, LatAm Governments Seek Pragmatic Middle Way Over Past Rights 
Abuses, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2788971 [hereinafter Oliv-
era, LatAm Governments]. 
ll6 /d. 
430 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:419 
ence and influence of the military through its retired officers now in 
the legislature also makes the job more difficult.117 
A. "Truth Commissions" 
Some Latin American countries have used truth commissions to 
address the problem of human rights abuses under the military dicta-
torships.l18 These commissions had as their goals the investigation 
into human rights abuses and the determination of the fate of the 
disappeared.ll9 While they succeeded in uncovering much of the 
abuse as well as the identities of many of the disappeared, the com-
missions faced obstacles in their searches for truth, including resis-
tance by the military, the sheer volume of allegations to investigate, 
and the limited time periods in which to accomplish their goals.12° 
In Argentina, the National Commission for the Disappearance of 
Persons (CONADEP), created in 1983, was composed of religious, 
political, and human rights leaders.l21 CONADEP had 180 days to 
complete its findings, and reviewed testimony on 7000 different cases, 
taking 50,000 pages of testimony.l22 CONADEP published its findings 
in 1984 in a report entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again), which became 
Argentina's greatest best seller.123 The findings of CONADEP resulted 
in the institution of trials of ex-military commanders the following 
year.124 
In Chile, the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 
was created in 1990.125 The preamble to the law creating the Commis-
sion stated, "[t]he moral conscience of the nation demands the truth 
[because] only upon a foundation of truth [will] it be possible to 
meet the basic demands of justice and to create the necessary condi-
tions for achieving true national reconciliation. "126 The Commission 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 53; Marcia Valente, Argentina: No Consensus on Chilean-
Style Human Rights Pane~ INTER PRESSE SERV.,July 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4092037 
[hereinafter Valente, No Consensus]; Valente, Chipping Away, supra note 18. 
119 See NINO, supra note 1, at 72-73. 
120 See MARK ENSALACO, CHILE UNDER PINOCHET REcovERING THE TRUTH 197-98, 
199-201, 210-ll (2000); NINO, supra note 1, at 72, 79-80. 
121 See NINo, supra note 1, at 72, 73. 
122 Id. at 72, 79. 
123 Id. at 80; AlmiTTI, supra note 10, at 43. 
124 See MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR 13 (1998). 
125 ENSALACO, supra note 120, at 183. 
126 Id. at 186. 
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had less than one year to report its findings.127 Even though the 
Commission was prohibited from naming the culpable,128 it still en-
countered resistance from the military, who refused to testify as to the 
most crucial information.129 With an unclear definition as to what 
constituted a "serious human rights violation," the government re-
quired the Commission to include soldiers killed by the resistance as 
victims.130 When the Commission submitted its report, it had exam-
ined over 3400 cases of human rights violations.l 31 Hundreds more 
came forward with allegations after the report was finished.l32 Despite 
the volume of research and investigation this report was unable to ac-
count for all the missing)33 
Nonetheless, Chile and Argentina discussed, and, in the case of 
Chile, have established new panels to further uncover abuses from the 
military regimes.134 These panels differ from those of the past in that 
they have the cooperation of the military,135 which often resisted giv-
ing the full truth to previous commissions.136 
In June, 2000, Chile established a pact between the military and 
civilian activists whereby the military promised to provide information 
on locating the remains of the victims of the dictatorship.137 This pact 
provides that those who supplied information would have their identi-
ties held in strict confidence, protected by a "professional secrecy" 
law.138 The panel received a six-month, renewable time frame in which 
to uncover and turn over information.139 The panel emphasized that 
by agreeing to this the military has formally recognized its part in the 
repression140 in an effort to help the country move "beyond its con-
troversial past. "141 Some human rights groups have rejected the panel 
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and its report, though, seeing it as "sacrific [ing] justice on the altar of 
truth."142 
In Argentina, the military called for a similar commission after 
the establishment of the Chilean panel.143 However, unlike in Chile, 
no human rights groups supported this panel, as the groups viewed 
the panel as an attempt to stop the legal summonses of those who 
committed human rights violations under the regime.I44 The Argen-
tine government backed the proposed panel to uncover the complete 
truth of the fate of the disappeared, which contained a promise simi-
lar to that of the Chilean commission to keep secret the identity of 
anyone who gave information to the panel.145 However, due to the 
human rights groups' rejection of the proposal, the commission was 
not created.146 
Uruguay also established a panel to investigate the truth of what 
happened to about 170 disappeareds.147 President Jorge Batlle estab-
lished a Commission for Peace in 2000, made up of delegates from 
the Catholic Church, the government, human rights groups, and po-
litical opposition, to hear testimony about the last days of victims' lives 
in order to determine where the bodies are located.148 Nevertheless, 
human rights groups fear that this report, together with a recognition 
by the Executive of the responsibility of the state for the regime's 
crimes, could be directed at bringing the issue of human rights to a 
close where the impunity laws could not.I49 
B. Prosecutions and Investigations Through Other Methods 
Various obstacles have hindered prosecutions of and investiga-
tions into human rights abuses in South America; often, these include 
a country's own laws.150 In Chile and Argentina, for example, the 
courts tried limited numbers of human rights violators, who then re-
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ceived a grant of amnesty or pardon by new laws.151 Similarly, in Uru-
guay, the impunity law, passed in 1986, stopped all trials for human 
rights violations.l52 In Brazil, a military amnesty remained undis-
turbed after the regime ended, and a government decree stopped all 
trials.153 
Despite the legal restrictions on prosecution, some countries 
have been able to move forward based on other provisions in their 
laws.I54 In Uruguay, while the impunity law forbade the trying of mili-
tary officers in civilian courts, Article 4 required the Executive to in-
vestigate the fate of the disappeared, particularly that of twelve chil-
dren born in captivity to kidnapped mothers.l55 While three post-
dictatorship governments refused to investigate, events in Argentina 
in the mid-1990's reinvigorated the human rights movements in Uru-
guay to renew their efforts to pursue the "right to truth," as embodied 
in Article 4.156 With judges still vulnerable to military pressure, Article 
4 was the only hope, but it took the election of a new president in 
2000, Jorge Batlle, for the government to acknowledge and promise 
to address the issue of kidnapped children and the disappeared.157 
Days after he was sworn into office, BatHe located the granddaughter 
of Argentine poet juan Gelman, who was born in captivity in Uruguay 
after Gelman's son and daughter-in-law were kidnapped by the Argen-
tine regime.158 Batlle also established the Commission for Peace to 
investigate the fate of the Uruguayan disappeared, but only within the 
confines of the impunity laws.I59 Moreover, Article 4 limits truth to 
what the Executive and military are willing to tell, and only allows for 
investigation into disappearances, which were not the main form of 
repression in Uruguay.I60 
In Brazil, where the government closed the cases of the disap-
peared in 1995, its congress has opened an unprecedented investiga-
tive commission to investigate crimes related to Operation Condor.161 
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New evidence about Brazil's involvement in Condor has stirred up 
human rights activists and caused the government to investigate the 
deaths of former presidents.l62 The commission's main focus is the 
death of former President Joao Goulart, who was the last elected 
president before the military junta began ruling in 1964.163 The for-
mer President resided in exile in Argentina when he supposedly died 
of heart problems, but authorities permitted neither an autopsy nor a 
return of his body for burial in Brazil.164 The commission also will in-
vestigate the deaths of former Presidents Juscelino Kubitschek, who 
died in a 1976 car crash, and Alencar Castello Branco, the first mili-
tary dictator, who died in a mysterious plane crash in 1967 after call-
ing for a return to democracy.165 
C. Baby-snatching in Argentina 
When Argentinean military officers went on trial for human 
rights abuses in the 1980s, they faced no charges for kidnapping chil-
dren.l66 In order to charge this crime, there had to be evidence that 
there was a systematic plan for such kidnapping.l67 Isolated incidents 
did not suffice.l68 Because the officers had no convictions for kidnap-
ping children, however, their pardons and the amnesty laws did not 
cover this crime.l69 In 1996, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 
a human rights group founded by the grandmothers of the kid-
napped children, brought suit against military officers, charging them 
with a systematic plan to abduct their opponents' children, change 
their identities, and illegally adopt them.I7o 
Investigation into the allegations of baby-snatching uncovered a 
systematic plan to kidnap babies, falsify identities, and forge public 
documents, all of which were planned and supported by the dictator-
ship.171 Records found after a raid on the Navy headquarters and 
other Navy offices included irregular birth certificates from that era, 
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as well as records of births to infertile parents and of women giving 
birth at home, which was highly unusual.172 
The uncovered information is chilling. It is estimated that four to 
five hundred children were taken from young parents who were kid-
napped and then disappeared.173 Politically acceptable families, in-
cluding military officers and police, then adopted the babies, al-
though some families adopted the children in good faith.l74 
Operation Condor may have facilitated sending the abducted chil-
dren to other countries, which explains why some Argentinean chil-
dren were found in Chile or Paraguay.I75 Under Condor, illegal adop-
tions for profit became a thriving business because the number of 
political prisoners was so high.l76 
Stealing babies for rearing by "acceptable" families was intended 
to create a new breed of "super patriot," supportive of the Army, who 
would lead Argentina into the twenty-first century.177 The military 
junta set out to systematically eliminate an entire generation of left-
wing political opponents.I78 As one general put it, "[s]ubversive par-
ents teach their children subversion. This has to be stopped."179 
According to the survivors of the torture and the investigation by 
the Grandmothers, as many as 500 pregnant women were kept alive in 
detention until they gave birth.180 There were three secret centers, 
including the Navy Mechanics School in Buenos Aires, also known as 
ESMA, and the headquarters of Navy intelligence, which had "facili-
ties" for pregnant women.181 There, at the regime's most notorious 
torture center, their jailers gagged and abused these women,l82 fore-
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ing them to give birth blindfolded and tied to tables.l83 Their babies 
were taken within minutes of delivery and adopted, often by the very 
people who had killed the mothers.l84 Although their jailers led some 
new mothers to believe that they would be freed,185 after the births 
their captors shot some women and put others on aircraft and then 
threw them out over the Atlantic Ocean)86 
Prosecutors filed charges against nine officers for the baby-
snatching scheme, leading to the arrest of all nine by 1998.187 More 
army officers involved have been arrested since then.l88 The govern-
ment placed former General Jorge Videla under house arrest for his 
part in the plan, and in January, 1999, the other eight former leaders 
allegedly responsible for the kidnapping received house arrest, where 
they remain.l89 An investigation by federal Judge Adolfo Bagnasco 
determined that the baby-snatching plan had two stages: the kidnap-
pings took place in the first three years of the dictatorship, then the 
kidnappings were covered up during the years after the Falklands 
War.l90 
Military resistance and interference has hindered the investiga-
tions and prosecutions.191 While the armed forces accept the prosecu-
tion of retired officers responsible for the baby kidnappings, they are 
not as supportive of efforts to investigate those officers who are still in 
active service.l92 Early in 2000, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces asked Judge Bagnasco to transfer the baby-snatching case to its 
jurisdiction.l93 When Bagnasco refused, the case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which accepted the case.194 In August, 2000, the Su-
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preme Court rejected the army's petition.I95 The Army also has de-
nied the existence of any secret files containing information about 
"dirty war" repression, files that would aid in the prosecution of the 
baby-snatchers, claiming that all such information was destroyed)96 
Another obstacle is the aging memories of the witnesses, many of 
whom are former army officials who are now in their seventies)97 Now 
elderly, many claim to have no knowledge or memory of the kidnap-
pings.198 Investigations continue, however, as there remain many more 
officers who were involved but have yet to be arrested. 199 
D. Other Countries' Investigations and Prosecutions of 
South American Atrocities 
1. Europe and Israel 
Prosecutions of South American military officials for human 
rights violations during the military regimes are not confined to 
South America.200 Prosecutors in Europe have taken on the task of 
bringing former officials to justice for their violations against Euro-
pean citizens and against humanity at large.20I In the process, they 
have served as a catalyst for charges against former dictators in Chile, 
Argentina, and BraziJ.202 
In Italy, it took sixteen years of investigation to bring two former 
members of Argentina's military to trial for the deaths of eight Italian-
born Argentineans.2°3 Trials began in October, 1999, after an investi-
gation into 600 disappearances.2°4 Testimony from, among others, 
Uruguayan Lilian Celiberti, who testified regarding Italians who may 
have been detained in Brazil and then transferred to Uruguay in 
1978, aided these investigations. 2°5 Celiberti herself was detained and 
tortured in Brazil in 1978 and then transferred to Uruguay under 
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Condor.206 Italian magistrates decided that they had enough evidence 
of about eight disappearances to go to trial and convicted a total of 
seven Argentinean military officials2°7 while rejecting the defense's 
argument that the cases were barred because of Argentina's Full Stop 
and Due Obedience Laws.2°8 All received sentences in absentia-five 
received sentences of twenty-four years each, and two received life 
sentences, one of whom, Carlos Suarez, already was under house ar-
rest in Argentina for suspicion of participating in the kidnapping of 
babies.209 Italy also is investigating the disappearance of Italians in 
Chile.210 
In Spain, Judge Baltasar Garzon first charged former Chilean dic-
tator Augusto Pinochet with numerous human rights crimes in 
1998.211 English officials, however, determined that Pinochet could 
not be extradited to Spain due to his ill health, and allowed Pinochet 
to return to Chile.212 In Chile, however, officials stripped Pinochet of 
his immunity from prosecution, clearing the way for his prosecution 
at home.213 
Garzon turned his attention to Argentina, investigating "dirty 
war" crimes under the notion of universality, crimes that are so 
horrific that they can be tried anywhere.214 In March, 2000, Garzon 
indicted ninety-eight former military junta members on charges of 
genocide, terror, and torture.215 Of those, Richard Cavallo, individu-
ally was charged with the torture, disappearance, and execution of 21 
people, and linked to 227 disappearances, ll 0 cases of torture, and 16 
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instances of baby-snatching.216 Garzon claims that some of the victims 
were Spanish, and is backed by fellow High Court Justices against 
other Spanish prosecutors who believe that he lacks jurisdiction over 
these crimes.217 Also in Spain, the 1992 Nobel Peace Prizewinner, 
Rigoberta Menchu, brought a genocide complaint against the Gua-
temalan military, but the Spanish National Court determined that 
Spain lacked jurisdiction to hear this com plaint. 218 
Other countries also are conducting investigations and indicting 
former Argentinean officials for human rights crimes.219 France an-
nounced in August, 2000, that it too would seek the extradition of Ri-
cardo Cavallo, which followed on the heels of its extradition request 
for former Major Jorge Olivera for kidnapping, torture, and disap-
pearance of a French citizen.220 In October, 2001, a French judge is-
sued warrants for fifteen Chilean officials under the military regime 
for the disappearance of French citizens.22l Furthermore, the Israeli 
Parliament announced a plan in August, 2000 to investigate the fate 
of J ewish-Argentinean disappeareds. 222 
2. The United States 
The United States is in the unique position of having the ability 
to both hinder and help investigations into human rights abuses in 
South America.223 Documents held by the State Department, Penta-
gon, and CIA may hold information that would shed light on investi-
gations in Argentina and Chile.224 The United States likely had close 
ties to Chile during Pinochet's regime, and while its relations with Ar-
gentina were not as strong, it is also likely that the CIA had a strong 
intelligence operation there during Argentina's military regime.225 
Chilean Judge Guzman in fact, seeks to question Henry Kissenger 
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about the U.S. role in the overthrow of Salvatore Allende.226 Former 
President Clinton ordered the release of declassified documents by 
the national security agencies in order to help investigations into acts 
of political violence in Chile,227 and by mid-2000, the agencies had 
released 7500 documents.228 However, the CIA has refused to release 
all of its documentation on Chile, particularly information that might 
be crucial to the trial of Pinochet, claiming that to do so would dis-
close too much information about the CIA's practices.229 
In August, 2000, then Secretary of State Madeline Albright met 
with activists in both Chile and Argentina and promised to help de-
classify the documents that would assist in determining the fate of the 
kidnapped babies and shed some light on Operation Condor.230 In 
September, 2000, there was somewhat of a breakthrough in determin-
ing the U.S. role in Chile, as Congress received information that the 
CIA had maintained ties with the director of Chile's secret police dur-
ing the period of the worst abuses. 231 
Resistance by the CIA not only affects South American prosecu-
tions for human rights abuses, but also affects the U.S. Justice De-
partment.232 The Justice Department reopened its investigation into 
the 1976 car bombing in Washington D.C. which took the lives of Or-
lando Letelier, a Chilean diplomat, and his American assistant, Ronni 
Moffitt.233 Considered an act of terrorism on U.S. soil, the Justice De-
partment reopened the case after the arrest of Pinochet in Britain,234 
and investigators arrived in Chile in March, 2000 to begin questioning 
witnesses in order to determine Pinochet's role in the assassination.235 
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR OBTAINING JUSTICE 
The indictment of Pinochet by Judge Garzon of Spain and the 
British agreement to Pinochet's arrest in England were instrumental 
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in provoking international cooperation and willingness to investigate 
and prosecute South American human rights violations.236 These ac-
tions are indicative of a maturation of international law and institu-
tions that focus on human rights which will be instrumental in pres-
ent and future pursuits of justice for these past abuses.237 In addition, 
the increasing globalization of Latin America through trade and in-
vestment has resulted in the development of a spirit of cooperation 
and an exchange of information that is enabling countries to begin to 
pursue justice through avenues not used in the past.23S While there 
are still legal challenges and dissatisfaction, these innovative ap-
proaches to accountability and extradition will allow true justice to be 
achieved in South America and throughout the world.239 
A. Extradition Requests 
The extradition request by Spain for General Pinochet and Eng-
land's subsequent legal analysis of the request set precedent in inter-
national law.240 England based its examination of the extradition re-
quest on the 1984 International Torture Convention. 241 This 
Convention held that torture is not a legitimate part of any official's 
job, and therefore is not protected by immunity, thus allowing Spain 
to request the extradition.242 English courts ruled in 1999 that Pino-
chet could be extradited to Spain for charges of torture that occurred 
after 1988, when the Convention came into effect in the United 
Kingdom. 243 
While the Torture Convention would seem to be an obvious basis 
of support for extradition of other former heads of state, most of the 
countries that have ratified the Convention have been reluctant to 
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adopt it in this way.244 Even where national courts can use the Conven-
tion, there will be no trial unless the government allows it.245 The 
United Kingdom showed that it considered itself and the European 
Union bound under the Convention's provision for the extradition of 
suspected torturers by allowing trial to determine whether Pinochet 
should be extradited.246 Through the United Kingdom's actions, the 
hope is that other countries will become more open to using the Con-
vention in the same way, thus allowing for suspected torturers to be 
brought to justice wherever they may be.247 
Additionally, there is possibly a more effective option on which to 
base extradition requests for suspected human rights abusers from 
the Condor military regimes. 248 Extradition treaties between individ-
ual countries may serve as the best way to arrest and prosecute those 
former military officials who cannot be charged in their own coun-
tries due to immunity laws.249 Based upon the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, whereby any country can prosecute someone who has 
committed one of the more heinous types of human rights abuses, 
some countries have begun to order the arrest and extradition of pre-
viously untouchable suspects.250 
In February, 2001, Mexico decided to extradite Ricardo Cavallo, 
a former military officer in Argentina, to Spain, per the indictment 
and extradition request of Judge Garzon.251 Mexico's decision was not 
based on the Torture Convention, however, but on the extradition 
treaty between Mexico and Spain.252 Breaking legal ground and thus 
going even further than the Pinochet arrest and legal contest, this 
decision stated that, per the principle of universal jurisdiction, "tor-
ture is wrong with or without the [Torture] Convention," and there-
fore any country could extradite one suspected of torture.253 Barring 
overturn on appeal, this would be the first time that a person accused 
of human rights violations was extradited to a country different from 
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the one in which the crimes occurred. 254 A similar case is that of for-
mer Argentine officer Jorge Olivera, arrested in Rome on a French 
warrant for his part in the kidnapping and death of French citizens in 
Argentina during the military regime.255 If Italy decides to extradite 
him, this ruling and the Cavallo ruling could help other countries re-
luctant to apply the Torture Convention as England did to extradite 
suspected human rights abusers through their own extradition trea-
ties with other countries.256 
Extraditions of this sort, however, may encounter obstacles, as 
countries like Argentina have expressed support instead for the prin-
ciple of territoriality, whereby crimes like those of Cavallo would only 
be tried in the country in which they occurred.257 It is based upon this 
idea that Argentina has protected military officials indicted by Judge 
Garzon for their part in "dirty war" abuses from extradition.258 Argen-
tina also has refused to give full support to investigations of its nation-
als occurring in other countries.259 The continued influence and pres-
sure of the military, particularly in Argentina and Chile, also makes 
the prosecutions and extraditions more difficult.260 In Argentina, the 
military is particularly unhappy with the current trend of arrests and 
indictments, especially that of Olivera, who served as counsel to other 
officers facing similar charges.261 Rather than defend Olivera, though, 
Argentina has said that it will limit its assistance in his case to provid-
ing legal aid from the consul. 262 
B. Accountability 
Spain's request for the extradition of Pinochet was also important 
for its advancement of the idea of holding former military officers 
254 Cordoba, supra note 214; Patrick Moser, Mexican Authorities to Extradite Argentine Ex-
Officer to Spain, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Feb. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2334111. 
255 Valente, justice, supra note 211. 
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accountable for their human rights abuses.263 The request helped 
contribute to the doctrine of indirect chain of command responsibil-
ity for human rights violations that was established at Nuremberg after 
World War II, and the courts in the United Kingdom "clarified the 
potential culpability of former heads of state for human rights 
abuse. "264 These decisions have resulted in a new wave of human 
rights accountability throughout the world.265 
In August, 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court stripped Pinochet 
of his immunity from prosecution, which he held as a "lifetime sena-
tor."266 The penetration of Pinochet's seemingly impervious shield of 
immunity was a victory for justice in Chile and throughout the world, 
putting other former dictators on alert that they too could face prose-
cution after years of being untouchable.267 The action also raised the 
stature of the Chilean judiciary, which had come under fire for its 
failure to defend human rights under Pinochet's rule.268 Chile also 
partially withdrew the 1978 self-amnesty, allowing for the arrest of 
dozens of former military officers for disappearances and kidnap-
pings, based on the evolving doctrine that "forced disappearance-
kidnapping is an ongoing crime not subject to statutes of limita-
tions. "269 The Chilean courts held then, that in Pinochet's case, the 
1978 self-amnesty did not apply to the prosecutions of "disappear-
ances" because of the ongoing nature of the crime.270 In July, 2001, 
however, the Chilean courts determined that Pinochet was too ill to 
stand trial for his crimes.271 That ruling was challenged in October, 
200}.272 
Some Condor countries are mirroring the act of stripping away a 
former dictator's immunity, which may serve to encourage others to 
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264 /d. 
265 See id. 
266 Chile: Human Rights, supra note 211. 
267 See id.; Yanina Olivera, Ruling Stripping Pinochet of Immunity Death Knell to Dictator 
Freedom, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,June 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2810270 [hereinafter Oliv-
era, Ruling]. 
268 Chile: Human Rights, supra note 211. 
269 Brysk, supra note 237. 
270 See Reed Brody, justice: the First Casualty of Truth? The Global Movement to End Impunity 
for Human Rights Abuses Faces a Daunting Question, NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 25, available at 
2001 WL 2132497. 
271 See Eduardo Gallardo, Pinochet Hit With Criminal Complaint, AP ONLINE, Nov. 6, 
2001, available at 2001 WL 29791226. 
272 See id. 
2002] justice for Victims of South American Military Regimes 445 
finally prosecute their own, previously immune, former leaders.273 For 
Uruguay, the implementation of Article 4 in order to obtain justice 
may result in limited success, but activists instead may be encouraged 
by the arrests of Pinochet and the trials of military officials from Ar-
gentina and Chile to change their strategy.274 Paraguayan dictator Al-
fredo Stroessner ruled from 1954-1989, and has been living in exile 
in Brazil ever since under the protection of political asylum.275 How-
ever, the head of Brazil's human rights commission has vowed tore-
voke Stroessner's asylum status so that he can be prosecuted for dis-
appearances under his rule.276 In December, 2000, a Paraguayan 
judge issued an arrest and extradition order for the former dictator.277 
In Argentina, in particular, there appears to be a new wave of 
thinking regarding immunity and amnesty for human rights abuses. 
In July, 2001, General Jorge Videla, already on house arrest for his 
role in the baby-snatching plan, was indicted for being part of an "il-
legal organization," Operation Condor, and his participation in the 
"forced disappearance of citizens of Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan, 
Paraguayan, Bolivian, and Brazilian origin."27S In November, 2001, an 
Argentine appeals court upheld the decision of a lower court that 
held that the amnesty laws of the 1980s were null and void for a hu-
man rights case involving victims of the dictatorship.279 The original 
case involved the "illegal appropriation of a minor" under the military 
regime, but the complainant requested that the case be expanded to 
include those who kidnapped and "disappeared" the minor's par-
ents.2SO The court annulled the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws in 
order to allow those responsible to face justice, despite their exonera-
tion for those crimes under the amnesty laws.281 In Argentina, a judge 
has the authority to nullify a law for a particular case only, so this an-
nulment is specific to this one case.282 However, because the appeals 
court upheld the ruling that the impunity laws are unconstitutional 
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because they contravene international treaties signed by Argentina, 
there is hope that new trials against military personnel responsible for 
human rights abuses will be forthcoming where previously there was 
no possibility of trying them at all. 283 
This new accountability for human rights violations can be seen 
in other countries as well.284 The indictments by Spain's judge Garzon 
of ninety-eight military officers for their part in "dirty war" abuses, 
based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, 285 and a case brought 
by a Guatemalan in a Spanish court against former dictator Efrain 
Montt, are other examples.286 In addition, the United States has used 
the Alien Torts Act to allow victims of Latin American torture to bring 
civil suits against their attackers when both are residents of the United 
States, resulting in judgments against generals from Argentina and 
Guatemala. 287 
Finally, the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
also may prove to be influential in the quest for justice for human 
rights victims of South America's military regimes.288 Since the end of 
the Cold War, countries have become more open to the idea of inter-
national crime, as evidenced by the ad-hoc, international war-crimes 
tribunals for the former YUgoslavia and Rwanda.289 Once it comes into 
effect, the permanent ICC will have jurisdiction to try those accused 
of the worst atrocities under the law, such as genocide and widespread 
crimes against humanity, but only in situations where the judiciaries in 
their home countries are too dysfunctional to try those perpetra-
tors.290 This jurisdiction would not seem to cover Condor countries 
because they do have functioning judicial systems.291 Also, the ICC will 
not have jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated before it comes into 
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284 See Serpico, supra note 214; Stroessner, supra note 277. 
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force.292 However, the hope is that the very existence of the court 
would serve as a source of encouragement or pressure for national 
courts to effectively investigate their own cases.293 
CONCLUSION 
The countries of Condor are coming to terms with their pasts 
while trying to shape their futures.294 However, governments are chal-
lenged by the task of balancing the need to address the past with the 
equally important need to move forward.295 This process is difficult 
because the scars of the past are still raw.296 In Argentina, for example, 
any child born between 1975 and 1980 could be a child of a disap-
peared, and the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo continue their 
search to find those children and reunite them with their biological 
families. 297 Not all of the children want to be found, however, and 
there are equally valid legal claims for those children who wish to 
leave the past alone and those biological families who want to find 
their stolen relatives.298 
The effects of the practice of human rights abuse under South 
America's military regimes continue to touch not only by the immedi-
ate victims, but others as well.299 Physical attacks on human rights ac-
tivists in several Latin American countries reflect an atmosphere in 
which not everyone wants justice to be served. 300 Middle and low-
ranking Argentinean military officers during the military regime now 
are seeing their chances at promotion disappear as their names re-
main on a list of those accused of crimes against humanity to which 
the Argentinean Senate refers when making promotions. 301 
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Prosecution of those responsible for past human rights abuses 
should go a long way towards healing the wounds caused by the mili-
tary regimes of South America, thus allowing those countries to focus 
on their futures without the cloud of the past hanging over them. 
While amnesties, immunity laws, and pardons in the Condor coun-
tries were once seemingly impenetrable shields against justice for the 
victims of those abuses, international awareness and cooperation have 
resulted in a new atmosphere of accountability. It is encouraging that 
countries are beginning to espouse the ideas of universal jurisdiction, 
realizing that torture and other human rights violations are not just 
crimes against the immediate victims, but crimes against the entire 
world, and therefore can be addressed by any country. As many for-
mer military officials are protected still from prosecution in their 
home countries, this may be the only way for justice to finally be 
served. 
